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Public health works behind the scenes and on the front lines every day to save lives and 
safeguard communities from health threats.
These threats can include the following:
• Naturally occurring disease outbreaks, such as 
a measles outbreak in a college dormitory, a 
multistate outbreak due to contaminated food, 
or a global pandemic caused by a novel virus
• Natural disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, 
and ice storms
• Accidents such as chemical spills and 
explosions
• Intentional incidents such as biological, 
chemical, or nuclear terrorism
All these threats have potential for harming the 
public and affecting the economic and social 
well-being of our communities and nation. 
Preparing adequately for public health threats 
requires continual and coordinated efforts that 
involve every level of government, the private 
sector, non-governmental organizations, and 
individuals.
Supporting Preparedness and 
Response Across the Nation
Because of its unique abilities to detect and 
respond to infectious, occupational, or 
environmental threats, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) plays a pivotal role 
in helping states prevent, detect, respond to, and 
rapidly recover from all types of public health 
threats.1 CDC's work in preparedness builds upon 
decades of science developed to promote the 
public's health.
To enhance preparedness and response, CDC 
supports state and local public health systems so 
they are better able to fulfill their responsibilities 
for the public health and welfare of the people in 
their jurisdiction. State and local governments
are closest to those impacted by incidents and 
have always had the lead in response. During a 
response, states coordinate resources and 
capabilities throughout the state and obtain 
additional resources and capabilities from other 
states and the federal government.
Preparing states for threats. All detection and 
response to public health threats begins at the 
local level, and communities must have strong 
and flexible capabilities that can be tapped for 
quick response to whatever threats emerge. CDC 
provides funding and technical assistance to 
state and local health departments to build and 
strengthen their capabilities needed for rapid 
response to emerging threats as well as for 
routine public health activities. This support is 
provided through CDC's Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative 
agreement.
Earlier this year, CDC established national 
standards2 for public health preparedness to 
help state and local public health departments 
identify gaps, determine specific jurisdictional 
priorities, and develop plans for building and 
sustaining capabilities. This capabilities-based 
approach merges public health and emergency 
management capabilities and serves as a 
framework for addressing state and local 
preparedness priorities and achieving desired 
outcomes. This new framework includes 15 
public health preparedness capabilities (see box 
on page 3) that align with the National Health 
Security Strategy3 and other national 
preparedness priorities. With this framework, 
public health departments now have evidence- 
informed guidance in developing annual and 
long-term plans to guide their preparedness 
strategies and investments. In addition to 
establishing national standards for public health 
preparedness, CDC has developed associated 
performance measures to demonstrate progress 
toward achieving these capabilities.
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15 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities
CDC continues to work to better define what it means to be prepared for all threats. This year, CDC identified 15 public 
health preparedness capabilities as the basis for state and local public health preparedness. CDC has prioritized these 
into two tiers, with an emphasis on those (Tier 1) that provide a strong basic foundation for public health preparedness.
Biosurveillance
Public Health Laboratory Testing (Tier 1)
Public Health Surveillance and Epidemiological 
Investigation (Tier 1)
Community Resilience
Community Preparedness (Tier 1)
Community Recovery (Tier 2) 
Countermeasures and Mitigation
Medical Countermeasure Dispensing (Tier 1) 
Medical Materiel Management and 
Distribution (Tier 1)
Non-pharmaceutical Interventions (Tier 2) 
Responder Safety and Health (Tier 1)
Incident Management
• Emergency Operations Coordination (Tier 1) 
Information Management
• Emergency Public Information and 
Warning (Tier 1)
• Information Sharing (Tier 1)
Surge Management
• Fatality Management (Tier 2)
• Mass Care (Tier 2)
• Medical Surge (Tier 2)
• Volunteer Management (Tier 2)
Source : Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning. Available at www.cdc.gov/nhnr/canabllltles
Helping states respond to emergencies. When 
disaster strikes, CDC is also prepared to respond 
and support national, state, and local partners 
with additional resources. CDC's Emergency 
Operations Center serves as a round-the-clock 
command center to coordinate expertise for 
efficient information exchange with state 
partners, and to deploy CDC staff and 
equipment to the site of an emergency. CDC's 
Strategic National Stockpile also stands ready to 
deliver critical medicines and medical supplies 
to states when local supplies run out or are 
commercially unavailable.
Overview of federal response to emergencies.
CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response leads the agency's preparedness and 
response activities by providing strategic 
direction, support, and coordination for activities 
across CDC as well as with local, state, tribal, 
national, territorial, and international public
health partners.4 The mission of this office is to 
strengthen and support the nation's health 
security to save lives and protect against public 
health threats. When public health is prepared, 
people's health is protected and communities 
are more resilient.
CDC's public health response activities are 
coordinated through the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response, the principal 
advisor to the Secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services on all matters 
related to bioterrorism and other public health 
emergencies. Lead federal responsibility for 
emergency response lies with the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose 
National Response Framework established a 
single comprehensive structure for responding 
to all types of hazards.5 In addition, the DHS 
National Preparedness Guidelines provide the 
vision, capabilities, and priorities for national 
preparedness.
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About This Update Report
CDC has now published four preparedness 
reports to demonstrate how federal investments 
are improving the nation's ability to respond to 
public health threats and emergencies.6 This 
report is an update to CDC's 2010 state-by-state 
report; it presents available data that 
demonstrate trends and document progress in 
two important preparedness activities, 
laboratory capabilities and response readiness 
planning. These data do not represent all 
preparedness activities occurring in states and 
localities. As other data become available, they 
will be included in future reports.
Fact sheets in this report present data on 
activities occurring from 2007 to 2010 in the 50 
states and 4 localities (Chicago, Los Angeles 
County, the District of Columbia, and New York 
City) directly funded by CDC's PHEP cooperative 
agreement.
The report is organized as follows:
Key Findings and M oving Forward provides 
a summary of progress reported and a brief
overview of current challenges and plans to 
improve the impact and effectiveness of 
preparedness and response activities.
Section 1 presents an overview of progress and 
national-level data on the following:
• Laboratory activities critical for identifying and 
confirming health threats
• Response readiness planning activities related 
to the ability of a state or metropolitan 
statistical area to receive, stage, and store 
medical assets received from CDC's Strategic 
National Stockpile
Section 2 features fact sheets with data on 
laboratory and response readiness planning 
activities in the 50 PHEP-funded states and the 4 
localities of Chicago, the District of Columbia, Los 
Angeles County, and New York City.
Appendices provide explanations of the fact 
sheet data points and their significance, and 
present technical assistance review scores for the 
Cities Readiness Initiative of CDC's Strategic 
National Stockpile.
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Key Findings and Moving Forward
Strong state and local public health systems are the cornerstone of an effective response 
to routine as well as large-scale and/or 
unexpected public health incidents. Public 
health departments have made progress in 
building and strengthening their preparedness 
and response capabilities. A summary of 
progress in laboratory capabilities and response 
readiness planning follows.
Laboratories: Identifying and 
Understanding Emerging Public 
Health Threats
Laboratories identify disease agents, toxins, and 
other health threats found in clinical specimens, 
food, or other substances. Rapid detection and 
characterization of health threats is essential for 
implementing appropriate control measures that 
can help mitigate the impact of the threats. The 
ability to detect and characterize health threats 
relies on the availability of laboratory equipment, 
a trained workforce, accurate and consistent 
methods, and quick data-exchange systems.
Accomplishments for biological and chemical 
laboratories for 2008 to 2010 include the 
following:
• Biological laboratory capabilities and 
capacities were strong in most states and 
localities. Overall, biological laboratories 
improved their abilities to rapidly identify 
certain disease-causing bacteria (often 
implicated in foodborne disease outbreaks) 
and send reports to CDC. For example, the 
number of states that submitted at least 90% 
of E. coli test results to CDC's PulseNet 
database within 4 working days of receiving 
the samples increased from 29 in 2008 to 38 
in 2010. In addition, Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN) biological laboratories 
successfully maintained a high proficiency
test pass-rate for detecting other biological 
agents - the pass rate was consistently 
over 90% from 2008 to 2010. (See Table 4 on 
page 14.)
LRN chemical laboratories increased their 
abilities to rapidly detect and quantify 
chemical agents. The average total number of 
methods successfully demonstrated by the 
more advanced LRN laboratories (Levels 1 
and 2) to rapidly detect chemical agents 
during proficiency testing rose from 6.7 
methods in 2009 to 8.9 methods in 2010.
(See Table 4 on page 15.) These methods are 
important for determining how widespread 
an incident was, identifying individuals 
needing treatment, and helping law 
enforcement officials determine the origin of 
the agent.
• In addition, LRN's most advanced chemical 
laboratories (Level 1) dramatically reduced 
the amount of time needed to process and 
report on samples during the LRN Surge 
Capacity Exercise. This exercise demonstrates 
the ability of our nation to respond to a large- 
scale chemical incident like the Tokyo sarin 
subway attack of 1995. Between 2009 and 
2010, the average hours to process and report 
on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratories during 
this exercise decreased from 98 hours to 56 
hours. (See Table 4 on page 15.)
Response Readiness Planning: 
Improving Response to Threats 
through Planning for Medical Asset 
Distribution
Responding effectively to a public health 
emergency often requires complex logistical 
planning for activities such as the distribution of 
medicines or other supplies to a community.
Public health 
departments have 
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Because these activities involve many different 
community agencies, everyone involved in 
emergency response must plan strategies and 
regularly exercise (practice) them together. All 50 
states and the 4 localities directly funded by the 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) 
cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, 
staging, storing, distributing, and dispensing 
medical assets from CDC's Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS) and other sources. CDC and state 
public health personnel conduct annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) to assess these 
plans and ensure continued readiness. Response 
readiness planning accomplishments for 2007 to 
2010 include the following:
• Most states improved their abilities to receive, 
distribute, and dispense medical assets 
received from the SNS from 2007 to 2010.
The national average for state TAR scores 
increased from 87 (out of 100) in 2007-08 to 
94 in 2009-10. (A score of 69 or higher in 
2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated that a state 
performed in an acceptable range. The 
acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or 
higher for 2009-10.)
• Average scores for the metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs) in CDC's Cities Readiness 
Initiative (CRI) also improved over time. CRI 
MSAs are selected based on population, 
geographical location, and potential 
vulnerability to a bioterrorism threat. The CRI 
program is designed to better prepare major 
U.S. metropolitan areas to effectively receive, 
distribute, and dispense medical 
countermeasures to their entire populations 
in a short time in response to large-scale 
public health emergencies. The national 
average for the 72 CRI MSAs increased from 
68 (out of 100) in 2007-08 to 88 in 2009-10. 
(Acceptable thresholds were 69 or higher in 
2007-09 and 79 or higher for 2009-10.)
Moving Forward
An effective public health response begins with a 
strong public health system that can conduct 
routine public health activities and adequately 
surge to meet the needs of a jurisdiction during a 
large-scale or unexpected emergency.
Today, public health departments face increasing 
challenges that may jeopardize their abilities to 
support a sufficient response to a public health 
incident. Challenges include continuing budget 
cuts at federal and state levels, workforce 
shortages, and an ever-evolving list of public 
health threats. In 2010, 12 (24%) states did not 
submit 90% of E. coli test results to CDC's 
PulseNet database within 4 working days, 
slowing down identification of outbreaks (see 
Table 2 on page 11). These and other challenges 
are causing state and local planners to express 
concerns over the ability to sustain the real and 
measureable advances made in public health 
preparedness.
Public health officials likely will need to make 
difficult choices to ensure that federal dollars are 
directed to priority functions and services that 
result in more resilient and better prepared 
communities. CDC's Public Health Preparedness 
Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local 
Planning2 provides a guide that state and local 
public health departments can use to plan their 
priorities and decide which capabilities they have 
the resources to build or sustain.
CDC strongly recommends that states and 
localities receiving PHEP funding prioritize the 
order of the 15 public health preparedness 
capabilities in which they intend to invest. Their 
evaluations should be based on assessments of 
jurisdictional risks and current capabilities and 
gaps. In addition, CDC encourages state and local 
public health departments to focus on building 
capabilities that provide a strong foundation for
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public health preparedness. Toward that end, 
CDC has prioritized the 15 capabilities into two 
tiers with an emphasis on Tier 1 (see box on 
page 3).
Looking ahead, HHS is working to better align 
the PHEP and Hospital Preparedness Program 
(HPP) cooperative agreements to improve their 
impact and effectiveness. The HPP, managed out 
of the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response, provides leadership 
and funding to improve surge capacity and 
enhance community and hospital preparedness
for public health emergencies.7 The alignment of 
PHEP and HPP will be accomplished through one 
Funding Opportunity Announcement in 2012 
that will facilitate joint coordination of grants 
administration, management, and performance 
reporting. This closer alignment will advance 
national preparedness by strengthening 
collaboration between public health and medical 
preparedness - major components of national 
health security - and will also reduce the current 
programmatic burdens on funding recipients as 
well as federal government costs.
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Laboratory Capabilities: Identifying and 
Understanding Emerging Public Health Threats
Laboratories are a critical component of rapid response to health threats. They identify 
disease agents, toxins, and other health threats 
found in clinical specimens, food, or other 
substances. Rapid detection and characterization 
of health threats is essential for implementing 
appropriate control measures to mitigate the 
impact of these threats. During the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic, for example, laboratories 
around the country were able to rapidly test for 
and confirm infections, which supported 
decisions about treatments and measures to 
control the spread of disease. The ability to 
detect and characterize health threats relies on 
the availability of laboratory resources (including 
a trained workforce), accurate and consistent 
methods, and quick data-exchange systems.
CDC manages the Laboratory Response Network 
(LRN), a group of local, state, federal, and 
international laboratories with unique testing 
capabilities for confirming high priority 
biological and chemical agents. Located 
strategically across the United States and abroad, 
LRN member laboratories play a critical role in 
their state or locality's overall emergency 
response plan to detect, characterize, and 
communicate about confirmed threat agents. 
Members perform standardized tests yielding 
reliable results within hours. Approximately 90% 
of the U.S. population lives within 100 miles of an 
LRN laboratory, decreasing the time needed to 
begin the response to a terrorist attack or 
naturally occurring outbreak.
Highlights of state and locality laboratory 
activities related to preparedness appear on the 
following pages. See the summary table on 
pages 14-15 for national-level data on laboratory 
activities (Table 4).
Nationwide Testing for Responding 
to Biological Threats
The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) was 
established in 1999 to create national laboratory 
capacity for testing biological threat agents and 
dangerous toxins. Specific examples of biological 
threats include anthrax, smallpox, plague, and 
botulism.8
LRN biological laboratories are designated as 
national, reference, or sentinel laboratories.
• National laboratories, including those at CDC, 
have the most advanced capabilities. These 
laboratories are responsible for specialized 
strain characterizations, bioforensics, 
select agent activity, and handling highly 
infectious agents.
• Reference laboratories perform tests to detect 
and confirm the presence of a threat agent.
• Sentinel laboratories are commercial, private, 
and hospital-based laboratories that test 
clinical specimens in order to either rule out 
suspicion of a biological threat agent or ship 
to reference or national laboratories for 
further testing.
CDC provides funding through the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative 
agreement to the 50 states and 4 localities to 
establish and maintain LRN biological public 
health laboratories. In addition to the 
laboratories that receive PHEP funding, other 
laboratories that participate in the LRN include 
state and locally funded public health 
laboratories as well as federal, military, 
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In 2010, a total of 142 LRN laboratories in the 
United States could test for biological agents;
139 of these were reference laboratories and 3 
were national laboratories.9 These laboratories 
maintain relationships with numerous sentinel 
laboratories in their jurisdictions that refer 
suspicious specimens to them for more 
advanced testing.
Highlights of state and local activities conducted 
to enhance their laboratory capabilities follow. 
See individual fact sheets starting on page 20 for 
specific scores.
Most laboratories passed proficiency tests for 
detecting biological agents. CDC conducts 
proficiency testing to evaluate the ability of LRN 
reference and national biological laboratories to 
receive, test, and report one or more suspected 
biological agents to CDC. If a laboratory is unable 
to successfully test for an agent and report 
results within a specified period of time, it will 
not pass the proficiency test. From 2008 to 2010, 
LRN biological reference and national 
laboratories successfully maintained a high 
proficiency test pass-rate to identify biological 
agents in unknown samples (Table 1).
Training and outreach to sentinel laboratories 
continues. Sentinel laboratories play a key role 
in the early identification and response to 
emerging infectious diseases including potential 
bioterrorism events. From August 10, 2009 to 
August 9, 2010, 43 state public health 
laboratories (84%) reported sponsoring sentinel
laboratory training in their state. It is important 
to note that state public health laboratories 
continued to communicate emerging health 
information with sentinel laboratories from 2008 
to 2010. For example, in 2008 and 2010, 47 out of 
51 state public health laboratories (including the 
District of Columbia) used CDC's Health Alert 
Network (HAN) or other rapid method (blast 
email or fax) to communicate with sentinel 
laboratories and other partners for outbreaks, 
routine updates, training events, and other 
applications.10
Laboratories improved their abilities to 
rapidly identify disease-causing bacteria.
Public health officials must be able to quickly and 
accurately detect and determine the extent and 
scope of potential outbreaks and minimize their 
impacts. In 2011, for example, public health 
officials in several states worked with CDC to 
investigate a multistate outbreak of human 
infections linked to eating a type of sausage 
contaminated with the bacteria Escherichia coli 
O157:H7. The investigation led to the recall of 
some 23,000 pounds of the product, preventing 
additional illnesses and hospitalizations.
States and the District of Columbia receive CDC 
PHEP funding and are required to demonstrate 
that they can identify specific strains of E. coli 
O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes - both 
associated with foodborne disease outbreaks - 
and report results to CDC's PulseNet database 
within a target timeframe of 4 working days of 
receiving the samples.
Table 1: Proficiency Tests Passed by LRN Reference and/or National Laboratories; 2008-2010
Number of proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories
2008 2009 2010
261 out of 277 195 out of 204 312 out of 327
(94%) (96%) (95%)
Source: CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
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Table 2: Rapid Identification of Disease-Causing Bacteria by PulseNet Laboratories; 2008-2010
Source: CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10 
*Data for the 50 states; **Data for the 50 states and District of Columbia
PulseNet is a national network of public health 
and food regulatory agency laboratories 
coordinated by CDC. Participant laboratories 
perform DNA "fingerprinting" of bacteria by 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, which 
distinguishes strains of these bacteria.
States have improved their abilities to rapidly 
identify these bacteria. The number of states that 
submitted at least 90% of E. coli and L. 
monocytogenes test results to CDC's PulseNet 
database within 4 working days increased
between 2008 to 2010 (Table 2). For those states 
that missed the 4-day benchmark for E. coli in 
2010, the most commonly reported reason was 
laboratory workforce issues. Specifically, seven 
states reported issues such as staff shortages and 
lack of trained staff. Similarly, five states reported 
in 2010 that their L. monocytogenes data 
submission was affected by staffing issues such 
as staff turnover and furloughs. For additional 
information regarding laboratory workforce 
issues, see the box below.
States Facing Challenging Workforce Issues
From 2008 to 2010, more than 44,000 jobs were lost in state and local health departments, reducing staff such as public 
health physicians and nurses, laboratory specialists, and epidemiologists. Laboratorians provide critical expertise to 
effectively identify and respond to public health emergencies. According to a 2010 national survey, public health 
laboratories across the country are experiencing significant difficulties maintaining the highly skilled workforce of 
laboratorians necessary to ensure an effective response. State public health laboratories reported that the factors most 
severely impacting their workforce were non-competitive salaries (52%), lack of funding (48%), and hiring freezes 
(43%). From 2009 to 2010, the number of states reporting furloughs as a major workforce barrier increased from 32% to 
39%. In addition, CDC found that despite the overall progress reported by states in identifying specific bacteria 
associated with foodborne disease outbreaks, many states reported being unable to achieve performance measure 
benchmarks in 2010; workforce issues were among the reasons cited for missing the benchmark. As budget cuts 
continue, more state public health services and functions will likely be impacted, affecting states' ability to respond 
rapidly and effectively to public health threats.
Sources: National Association of County & City Health Officials and Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Letter to Congress 
Regarding Cuts Proposed in H.R. 1363 (April 7,2011); Association of Public Health Laboratories, Response by the Numbers: The Nation's Public 
Health Laboratories Protect the Country (2011); and CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
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Level 2 laboratory 
to Level 3 in 2010 
due to funding 
issues.
Nationwide Testing for Responding 
to Chemical Threats
In 2003, the LRN started testing clinical 
specimens to measure human exposure to 
toxic chemicals. LRN chemical laboratories are 
designated as Level 1, 2, or 3.
• Level 1 laboratories have the most advanced 
capabilities. These are surge-capacity 
laboratories that can test for an expanded 
number of agents, including nerve agents, 
mustard agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. 
They also maintain the capabilities of Level 2 
laboratories.
• Level2 laboratories test for a limited number of 
toxic chemical agents. They also maintain the 
capabilities of Level 3 laboratories.
• Level3 laboratories work with hospitals and 
other first responders to maintain competency 
in clinical specimen collection, storage, and 
shipment.
In 2010, a total of 57 LRN laboratories in the 
United States could handle and/or test for 
chemical agents; 10 of these were Level 1 
laboratories, 36 were Level 2 laboratories, and 11 
were Level 3 laboratories. Illinois reported 
downgrading its Level 2 laboratory to a Level 3 
that year due to funding issues, and Florida 
reported adding a Level 3 laboratory during that 
same time period.
CDC conducts annual proficiency testing for 
Level 1 and Level 2 chemical laboratories to
determine their abilities to use core and 
additional methods to rapidly detect and 
measure chemical agents that can cause severe 
health effects. These methods are considered 
important because they can help determine the 
scope of a real incident, identify those requiring 
long-term treatment, assist with non-emergency 
medical guidance, and help law enforcement 
officials determine the origin of the chemical 
agent. The core methods are significant as they 
offer new technical fundamentals in the methods 
that provide the foundation of LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities. The number of core methods 
increased from six in 2009 to eight in 2010.
The majority of LRN laboratories undergo 
proficiency testing in additional methods as well. 
These methods build upon the foundation 
established by the core methods, providing 
modifications to core techniques that allow for 
laboratories to test for additional agents and 
thereby expand their testing capabilities. 
Proficiency in additional methods is required for 
Level 1 laboratories and optional for Level 2 
laboratories. In 2009, there were six additional 
methods for Level 1 laboratories and up to five 
additional methods for Level 2 laboratories, 
depending on the state or locality needs. In 2010, 
there were five additional methods in which 
Level 1 laboratories should have demonstrated 
proficiency, and up to four additional methods in 
which Level 2 laboratories could have chosen to 
become proficient.
Table 3: Evaluating LRN-C Capabilities Through Proficiency Testing; 2009-2010
Methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and Level 2 laboratories 
to rapidly detect chemical agents
2009 2010
Average number of methods: 
6.7 total methods
Average number of methods: 
8.9 total methods
• 5.3 core methods (maximum: 6) • 7.1 core methods (maximum: 8)
• 1.4 additional methods (maximum: up to 6) • 1.7 additional methods (maximum: up to 5) 
Source: CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 data: 1/1/09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
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Level 1 and 2 laboratories increased their 
abilities to rapidly detect and quantify 
chemical agents. The average total number of 
methods (including both core and additional 
methods) successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and Level 2 laboratories rose from 6.7 methods in
2009 to 8.9 methods in 2010 (Table 3) - an 
increase of more than 30% in two years. In 2010, 
28 out of 46 Level 1 and/or Level 2 LRN chemical 
laboratories were able to demonstrate 
proficiency in all eight core methods. In 2010, 27 
out of 46 Level 1 and/or Level 2 LRN chemical 
laboratories demonstrated proficiency in at least 
one additional method to rapidly detect 
chemical agents.
Level 1 laboratories greatly reduced the 
amount of time needed to process large 
volumes of samples during a CDC exercise.
The LRN Surge Capacity Exercise demonstrates 
the ability of each of the ten Level 1 laboratories 
to test and report on 500 samples (a total of 
5000 samples) on a 24/7 basis. This exercise 
demonstrates the ability of our nation to respond 
to a large-scale chemical incident like the Tokyo 
sarin subway attack of 1995. The response time 
for the exercise is determined from the time the 
500 samples are received to the time the last test 
result is reported to CDC. Between 2009 and 
2010, the average hours to process and report on 
500 samples by Level 1 laboratories during the 
LRN Surge Capacity Exercise decreased from 98 
hours to 56 hours.
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National Snapshot of Laboratory
Activities
A summary table of national-level data on 
laboratory activities in 2008, 2009, and 2010 
appears below (Table 4). Note that these items 
represent available data for preparedness 
activities and do not fully represent all state and
locality laboratory efforts. For individual state 
and locality information in the area of laboratory 
activities, see individual fact sheets starting on 
page 20. See appendix 1 for an explanation of 
data points.
Table 4: National Snapshot of Laboratory Activities; 2008-2010
Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN) reference 
and/or national laboratories 
that could test for biological 
agents
Source: CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 data: 
9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 
data: 12/31/10
151 total LRN reference and 
national laboratories
148 LRN reference laboratories
3 LRN national laboratories
135 total LRN reference and 
national laboratories
132 LRN reference laboratories
3 LRN national laboratories
142 total LRN reference and 
national laboratories
139 LRN reference laboratories
3 LRN national laboratories
Proficiency tests passed by 
LRN reference and/or 261 out of 277 tests (94%) 195 out of 204 tests (96%) 312 out of 327 tests (95%)
national laboratories
Source: CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 data: 
1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 
2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
LRN laboratory ability to 
contact the CDC Emergency 
Operations Center within 2 
hours during LRN notificatio n 
drill
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC 
and in each state is eligible to 
participate in this drill, with the 
exception of CA, IL, and NY, where 
two can participate.
Source: CDC, OID (NCEZID);
2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 
data: 4/10 and 6/10
Number of states submitting 
at least 90%  of test results to 
CDC's PulseNet database 
within 4 working days
Source: CDC, OPHPR (DSLR);
2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08 (50 states);
2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09 (50 states 
and DC); 2010 data: 8/10/09 
-8/9/10 (50 states and DC)
39 out of 54 laboratories 
participated (72%)
54 out of 54 laboratories 
participated (100%)
35 out of 39 laboratories 
passed (90%)
51 out of 54 laboratories 
passed (94%)
Apr Jun
44 out of 54 54 out of 54
laboratories laboratories
participated (81%) participated (100%)
39 out of 44 52 out of 54
laboratories laboratories
passed (89%) passed (96%)
Escherichia coli 
O157:H7




















21 out of 31
states (68%)
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Laboratories: Chemical Capabilities
2009 2010
LRN-C laboratories with 
capabilities for responding if 
the public is exposed to 
chemical agents
Source: CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 
data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
56 LRN-C laboratories:
• 10 out of 56 were Level 1 laboratories
• 37 out of 56 were Level 2 laboratories
• 9 out of 56 were Level 3 laboratories
57 LRN-C laboratories:
• 10 out of 57 were Level 1 laboratories
• 36 out of 57 were Level 2 laboratories
• 11 out of 57 were Level 3 laboratories
Methods successfully 
demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to 
rapidly detect chemical agents 
during proficiency testing
Source: CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 
data: 1 /1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 
1/1/10-12/31/10
Average number of methods:
• 6.7 total methods
• 5.3 core methods
• 1.4 additional methods
34 out of 47 Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories 
successfully demonstrated all six core methods (72%)
26 out of 47 Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories 
successfully demonstrated at least one additional 
method (55%)
Average number of methods:
• 8.9 total methods
• 7.1 core methods
• 1.7 additional methods
28 out of 46 Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories 
successfully demonstrated all eight core methods (61%)
27 out of 46 Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories 




















LRN-C laboratories ability to 
collect, package, and ship 
samples properly during LRN
Source: CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 
data: 2/10/09-11 /9/09; 2010 data: 
1/1/10-12/31/10
Number of chemical agents 
detected by Level 1 and/or 
Level 2 laboratories during the 
LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT)
Note: Not all Level 1 and Level 
2 laboratories were eligible to 
participate in this exercise
Source: CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 
data: 8/24/09 and 10/05/09; 2010 
data: 9/13/10
Average hours to process and 
report on 500 samples by Level 
1 laboratories during the LRN 
Surge Capacity Exercise
Source: CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 
data: 1 /13/09-1 /18/09; 2010 data: 
5/18/10-5/22/10
53 out of 56 laboratories participated (95%) 
49 out of 53 laboratories passed (92%)
56 out of 57 laboratories participated 
56 out of 56 laboratories passed (100%)
Aug Oct Sep
589 out of 658 agents
(90%)
Note: A total of 14 
agents per laboratory 
could have been 
detected by the 47 
laboratories 
participating in this 
exercise.
31 out of 32 agents
(97%)
Note: A total of 1 agent 
per laboratory could 
have been detected by 
the 32 laboratories 
participating in this 
exercise.
664 out of 731 agents (91%)
Note: A total of 17 agents per laboratory could have 
been detected by the 43 laboratories participating in this
98 hours (range was 71 to 126 hours) 56 hours (range was 38 to 86 hours)
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Response Readiness Planning: Improving 
Response to Threats through Planning for 
Medical Asset Distribution
TO
Everyone involved in 
emergency response 
must plan strategies 
and regularly exercise 
(practice) them 
together.
Responding effectively to a public health emergency often requires complex logistical 
planning for activities such as the distribution of 
medicines or other supplies to a community. 
Because these activities involve many different 
community agencies, everyone involved in 
emergency response must plan strategies and 
regularly exercise (practice) them together. Many 
of the skills and resources needed for these 
activities - such as use of the Incident Command 
System (to define roles and responsibilities), 
communications, planning, and exercising - are 
also core needs for responding to day-to-day 
public health threats.
All 50 states and the 4 localities funded by the 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) 
cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, 
staging, storing, distributing, and dispensing 
medical assets from CDC's Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS). Assets include antibiotics, 
chemical antidotes, antitoxins, vaccines, antiviral 
drugs, and other life-saving medical supplies. 
These assets are designed to supplement and 
resupply state and local public health agencies in 
the event of a large-scale public health 
emergency.
Building the capability to ensure that key 
medical supplies are available during 
emergencies is a continuous process of acquiring 
and managing assets, providing technical 
assistance, and evaluating readiness. When 
certain SNS assets are deployed, CDC provides 
technical assistance support teams to work with 
state and local officials to ensure their efficient 
receipt and distribution upon arrival. Highlights 
of state and local activities conducted to 
enhance their response readiness planning 
follow. See individual fact sheets starting on 
page 20 for specific scores.
States improved their abilities to receive, 
distribute, and dispense medical assets. CDC
conducts annual technical assistance reviews 
(TARs) to assess state and locality plans to 
receive, stage, store, distribute, and dispense SNS 
assets during a public health emergency. Areas 
of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements 
that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions (see 
box below). CDC technical experts routinely 
consult with state, local, and large metropolitan 
health departments to assist them in developing 
plans specific to their jurisdictional needs and to 
identify and address gaps.
r Assessing State Readiness
CDC conducts annual reviews to assess state plans to receive and manage Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) assets. Plans are 
assessed by evaluating performance in the functional areas below. (See appendix 1 for function descriptions.)
• Developing a Plan with SNS Elements • Controlling Inventory
• Management of SNS • Repackaging
• Requesting SNS • Distribution
• Communications Plan (Tactical) • Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Public Information and Communication • Hospital and Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
Security • Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Receipt, Stage, Store
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Using a scale from 0 to 100, a TAR score of 69 or 
higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated that a 
state performed in an acceptable range in its 
planning to receive, stage, store, distribute, and 
dispense SNS medical assets. The acceptable 
threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 
2009-10. The national average for state TAR 
scores increased from 87 in 2007-08 to 94 in 
2009-10. Functional areas showing the largest 
improvement over the past three years include 
repackaging; hospital and alternative care 
facilities coordination; training, exercise and 
evaluation; and dispensing (Table 5).
Major metropolitan statistical area (MSA) TAR 
scores improved over time. The Cities 
Readiness Initiative (CRI) focuses on enhancing 
preparedness in major U.S. metropolitan areas 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population 
resides.11 Through CRI, state and large 
metropolitan area public health departments 
have developed plans to respond to a large-scale 
bioterrorism incident by dispensing antibiotics 
within 48 hours to the entire population of an 
identified MSA. The program was originally 
established in 2004 with 21 cities that were
selected based on criteria such as population and 
potential vulnerability to a bioterrorism threat. 
The program has grown to include a total of 72 
MSAs, with at least one in every state. (MSAs can 
consist of one or more jurisdictions and can 
extend across state borders, resulting in the 
representation of several states within one MSA. 
See appendix 2 for a listing of the individual MSA 
jurisdictions within each state.)
To ensure continued readiness, CDC and state 
public health personnel conduct annual TARs to 
assess the plans for each local jurisdiction within 
a state's CRI MSAs and measure capacity for 
functions considered critical. Scores (ranging 
from 0 to 100) for each planning jurisdiction are 
combined to compute an average score for the 
CRI MSA. The national average for the 72 CRI 
MSAs increased from 68 in 2007-08 to 88 in 2009­
10. A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008­
09 indicated that the CRI location performed in 
an acceptable range its plan to receive, 
distribute, and dispense SNS medical assets. The 
acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or 
higher for 2009-10.
Table 5: Technical Assistance Review Functional Areas That Demonstrated Improvement; 2007-2010
State  Im p rovem en ts in Response  Read iness Functions
























Functions with largest improvement:
• Repackaging (increase of 11 points)
• Hospital and Alternative Care Facilities Coordination 
(increase of 9 points)
• Distribution (increase of 6 points)
• Dispensing Prophylaxis (increase of 5 points)
• Controlling Inventory (increase of 5 points)
• Receipt, Stage, Store (increase of 5 points)
• Training, Exercise, and Evaluation (increase of 5 points)
Functions with largest improvement:
• Training, Exercise and Evaluation (increase of 6 points)
• Dispensing Prophylaxis (increase of 4 points)
• Public Information and Communication (increase of 4 
points)
• Controlling Inventory (increase of • points)
• Security (increase of 3 points)
• Hospital and Alternative Care Facilities Coordination
(increase of 3 points)
Source: CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007-8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance 
period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period

















A summary table of national-level data on 
response readiness planning activities from 2007 
to 2010 appears below (Table 6). Note that these 
items represent available data for preparedness
National Snapshot of Response
Readiness Planning Activities
activities and do not fully represent all state and 
locality response readiness planning efforts. For 
individual state and locality information in the 
area of response readiness planning activities, 
see individual fact sheets starting on page 20. 
See appendix 1 for an explanation of data points.
Table 6: National Snapshot of Response Readiness Planning Activities; 2007-2010
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Technical Assistance Review Scores - National Average 
for States
87 91 94
Assessing plans to 
receive, distribute, and
Function:
Developing a Plan with SNS Elements 93 96 95
dispense medical Management of SNS 92 95 96
assets from the Requesting SNS 98 100 99
Strategic National Communications Plan (Tactical) 93 94 96
Stockpile (SNS) Public Information and Communication 87 91 95
Security 88 90 93
Receipt, Stage, Store 91 96 97
Controlling Inventory 88 93 9. .
Repackaging 76 87 88
Distribution 87 93 94
Dispensing Prophylaxis 83 88 92
Hospital and Alternate Care Facilities Coordination 80 89 92
Training, Exercise, and Evaluation 84 89 95
Source: CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 
2007-08 data: 8/10/2007­
8/9/2008 performance 
period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 
performance period; 2009-10 
data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 
performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated 
performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased 
to 79 or higher for 2009-10.
Technical Assistance Review Scores -  National Average 
for the 72 Metropolitan Statistical Areas in CDC's Cities 
Readiness Initiative
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated 
performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased 
to 79 or higher for 2009-10.
68 80 88
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Section 2: Public Health Preparedness Activities 
in States and Localities
• Fact Sheets for 50 States and the 4 Localities of Chicago,
the District of Columbia, Los Angeles County, and New York City







I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 0 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1/09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Alabama
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 






















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 for a 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
N/A
2 reference 2 reference 
labs labs
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
5 out of 5 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests













Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
3 total methods 
3 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Did not pass
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 0 out of 14 
agents*
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





*Lab did not participate.
' CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1/09-9/14/09; 2010data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Alaska
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





' CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1/09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Arizona
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing





Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
1 out of 1 
test
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Arkansas
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR
2. Memphis, TN-MS-AR









'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







California Data includes Los Angeles County (LAC); see separate fact sheet for LAC-specific data.
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
2008 2009
22 reference 17 reference 
labs labs 
(includes LAC) (includes LAC)
28 out of 30 
tests
(includes LAC)
25 out of 25 
tests
(Includes LAC)



















Apr: 1 did not 
pass,









Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab 
One Level 2 lab (LAC)
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
Level 1 lab:
10 total methods 
6 core
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010) Level 2 lab (LAC):
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
4 total methods 
4 core
0 additional
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7
Level 1 lab: passed 
Level 2 lab (LAC):
passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Level 1 lab:
Aug: 13 out of 14 agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent 
Level 2 lab (LAC): 
Aug: 14 out of 14 agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
Level 1 lab:
112 hours 
(range: 71 to 126 hours)
One Level 1 lab 
One Level 2 lab (LAC)
Level 1 lab:
13 total methods 
8 core 
5 additional 
Level 2 lab (LAC):
7 total methods 
7 core 
0 additional 
Level 1 lab: passed 
Level 2 lab (LAC): 
passed 
Level 1 lab:
Sep: 13 out of 17 agents
Level 2 lab (LAC): 
Sep: 17 out of 17 agents
Level 1 lab:
49 hours 
(range: 38 to 86 hours)
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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California
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Fresno, CA
2. Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
3. Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
4. Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA
5. San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA
6. San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA















'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance In an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







Los Angeles County See separate fact sheet for California state data.
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







4 out of 4 
tests










Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
4 total methods 
4 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: not eligible
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Los Angeles County
A ll states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets 
include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to supplement state and local public health 
agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual technical 
assistance reviews (TAR) of state and directly funded locality plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key 
elements that are regarded as either critical or important planning steps within a variety of functions. TAR scores 
by function for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) Directly Funded Locality Scores1
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination

































'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 5 
tests
4 out of 5 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
3 total methods 
3 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 10 out of 14 
agents
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Colorado
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Connecticut
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance In an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests












Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
5 total methods 
5 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Delaware
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Dover, DE
2. Philadelphia-Camden-Cecil-Wilmington, PA-NJ-MD-DE









'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance In an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
C enters for D isease Control and  Prevention
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
District of Columbia
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
1 out of 1 
test
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Apr: did not 
participate







Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
0 total methods 
0 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Did not participate
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 5 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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District of Columbia
A ll states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets 
include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to supplement state and local public health 
agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual technical 
assistance reviews (TAR) of state and directly funded locality plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key 
elements that are regarded as either critical or important planning steps within a variety of functions. TAR scores 
by function for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) Directly Funded Locality Scores1
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination





























'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance In an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
12 out of 15 
tests
12 out of 12 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab 
One Level 3 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
Level 1 lab:
10 total methods
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010) 6 core
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
4 additional
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7
Level 1 lab: 
passed 
Level 3 lab: 
did not participate
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Level 1 lab:
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
Level 1 lab: 
123 hours 
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab 
Two Level 3 labs
Level 1 lab:
13 total methods 
8 core 
5 additional
Level 1 lab: 
did not participate 
Level 3 labs: 
both passed
Level 1 lab: 




(range: 38 to 86 
hours)
' CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Florida
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL
2. Orlando-Kissimmee, FL









'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance In an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing






Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests











Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 4 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and In each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified £ coli0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





' CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
59 79
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing





Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
2 out of 2 
tests
4 out of 4 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate In 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests








Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests

















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 12 out of 14 
agents
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests

















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Boise City-Nampa, ID
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
75 45 66
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests











Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
5 out of 5 
tests
5 out of 5 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.




Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab 
Two Level 3 labs Three Level 3 labs*
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
Level 2 lab:
6 total methods
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010) 6 core
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
0 additional
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7
Level 2 lab: 
did not pass 
Level 3 labs:
1 passed, 1 did not 
participate
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Level 2 lab: 
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
N/A




"Illinois downgraded its Level 2 lab to a Level 3 lab on 9/9/10 due to funding issues.
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile(SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
2. Peoria, IL
3. St. Louis, MO-IL





1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







Chicago See separate fact sheet for Illinois state data.
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Assessing LRN laboratory 
competency and reporting 
through exercises
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
Rapidly identified L monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
Lab located 
in Chicago is 
operated by 





in Chicago is 
operated by 





in Chicago is 
operated by 





Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
Lab located in 
Chicago is operated 
by the state of 
Illinois. See Illinois 
fact sheet.
Lab located in 
Chicago is operated 
by the state of 
Illinois. See Illinois 
fact sheet.
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 -
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8 -
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 -
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A ll states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets 
include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to supplement state and local public health 
agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual technical 
assistance reviews (TAR) of state and directly funded locality plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key 
elements that are regarded as either critical or important planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR 
scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) Directly Funded Locality Scores1
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination





























'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
competency and reporting 
through exercises
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests








Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. TAR scores by function for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of 
page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination



































The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.
2. Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio.
3. Indianapolis-Carmel, IN
4. Louisville, KY-IN









1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




3 reference 3 reference 
labs labs
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
2 out of 2 
tests
4 out of 4 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate In 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests














Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab*
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab*





*lowa has two labs with different capabilities that together represent the state's full capabilities.
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA
2. Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA






'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
1 out of 2 
tests tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate In 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests

















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Did not pass
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
5 6  | Public Health Preparedness: 2011 State-by-State Update on Laboratory Capabilities and Response Readiness Planning
Kansas
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
1. Kansas City, MO-KS








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 3 lab One Level 3 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core N/Amethods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
N/A
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio.
2. Louisville, KY-IN








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
2 out of 2 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
4 total methods 
4 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 12 out of 14 
agents
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Louisiana
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Baton Rouge, LA








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests

















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
5 core 
1 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
C enters for D isease Control and  Prevention
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories






Rapidly identified L monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests









Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
9 out of 9 
tests
6 out of 6 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified £ coli0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests























Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
7 total methods 
6 core 
1 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 11 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Baltimore-Towson, MD
2. Philadelphia-Camden-Cecil-Wilmington, PA-NJ-MD-DE
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania.
3. Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in District of Columbia, Maryland, 





1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
5 out of 5 
tests
4 out of 4 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
9 total methods 
6 core 
3 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
126 hours* 
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab





(range: 38 to 86 
hours)
*Massachusetts experienced issues with CDC's reporting system, which impacted this result.
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Massachusetts
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire.
2. Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA







'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing





Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
9 out of 9 
tests
5 out of 5 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests








Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
10 total methods 
6 core 
4 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
75 hours
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing





Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests








Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
9 total methods 
6 core 
3 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
78 hours 
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab





(range: 38 to 86 
hours)
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1 /08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Minnesota
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Fargo, ND-MN
The jurisdictions for this M SA  are located in M innesota and North Dakota.
2. Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI





'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests


















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 11 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Mississippi
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Jackson, MS
2. Memphis, TN-MS-AR'








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Missouri
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Kansas City, MO-KS
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Kansas and Missouri.
2. St. Louis, MO-IL








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests


















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Montana
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
100%
2 reference 2 reference 
labs labs
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Overall Score 81
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination




















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Iowa and Nebraska.
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
44 84 95
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing





Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
6 out of 6 
tests
5 out of 5 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
7 total methods 
6 core 
1 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Las Vegas-Paradise, NV
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
82 87 92
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab




Sep: 17 out of 17 
agents
N/A
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH










'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.
2. Philadelphia-Camden-Cecil-Wilmington, PA-NJ-MD-DE







1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
1 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not pass Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
10 total methods 
6 core 
4 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
71 hours 
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab




Did not participate; 
lab was moving
44 hours 
(range: 38 to 86 
hours)
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







New York Data includes New YorkCity (NYC); see separate fact sheet for NYC-specific data.
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents






(includes NYC) (includes NYC) (includes NYC)
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories





7 out of 8 tests 
(includes NYC)
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 





Rapidly identified £ coli0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests








Rapidly identified L monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab 
One Level 3 lab 
(NYC)
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
Level 1 lab:
10 total methods
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010) 6 core
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
4 additional
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7
Level 1 lab: passed 
Level 3 lab (NYC): 
passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Level 1 lab:
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
Level 1 lab:
73 hours 
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab 
One Level 3 lab 
(NYC)
Level 1 lab:
13 total methods 
8 core
5 additional
Level 1 lab: passed 
Level 3 lab (NYC): 
passed
Level 1 lab: 




(range: 38 to 86 
hours)
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08:2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
2. Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY
3. New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA












'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







New York City See separate fact sheet for New York state data.
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







4 out of 4 
tests










Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 3 lab One Level 3 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core N/Amethods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
N/A
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08:2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A ll states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets 
include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to supplement state and local public health 
agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual technical 
assistance reviews (TAR) of state and directly funded locality plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key 
elements that are regarded as either critical or important planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR 
scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) Directly Funded Locality Scores1
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination






























'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
11 out of 12 
tests
4 out of 4 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not pass Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08:2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunlcable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in North Carolina and 
South Carolina.
2. Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab*
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
3 total methods* 
3 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab*





*State reported three core methods meet its preparedness needs.
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Ft/ncf/on.-Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Fargo, ND-MN
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Minnesota and North Dakota.
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
70 71 89
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
C enters for D isease Control and  Prevention
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state Is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Did not pass
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 3 lab One Level 3 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core N/Amethods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
N/A
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN










'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
2 out of 2 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 3 lab One Level 3 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core N/Amethods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
N/A
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Oklahoma City, OK
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
79 100
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests


















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 3 lab One Level 3 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core N/Amethods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
N/A
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Oregon
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Oregon and Washington.
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
58 73 90
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests









Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
2 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
8 total methods 
6 core 
2 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 12 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab






operational on date 
of exercise
N/A
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.
2. Philadelphia-Camden-Cecil-Wilmington, PA-NJ-MD-DE







1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests











Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
2 total methods 
2 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 11 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08:2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Rhode Island
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
10 total methods 
6 core 
4 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Did not pass
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
100 hours
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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South Carolina
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC










'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Did not pass
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests


















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
4 total methods 
4 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 10 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Sioux Falls, SD
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
74 76 85
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests







Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
10 out of 11 
tests
5 out of 6 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate In 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
3 total methods 
3 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 6 out of 14 
agents
Oct: not eligible
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab






operational on date 
of exercise
N/A
1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Memphis, TN-MS-AR'
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Arkansas, Mississippi, and 
Tennessee.








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests










Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
23 out of 25 
tests
14 out of 15 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not pass Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 12 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Texas
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
2. Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate In 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests




















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
4 total methods 
4 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Utah
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Salt Lake City, UT
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
3 out of 3 
tests
1 out of 1 
test
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests



















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
7 total methods 
6 core 
1 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunlcable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Vermont
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 
assets from the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS)
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Burlington-South Burlington, VT
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
70 75 95
1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing




Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
4 out of 4 
tests
3 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
10 total methods 
6 core 
4 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
103 hours
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Virginia
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Richmond, VA
2. Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in North Carolina and Virginia.
3. Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in the District of Columbia, 





1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests












Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
7 out of 8 
tests
2 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
6 total methods 
6 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 13 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Washington
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
2. Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.







U.S. D E P A R T M E N T  O F  H EA LT H  A N D  H U M A N  SER V IC ES
C e n t e r s  f o r  D i s e a s e  C o n t r o l  a n d  P r e v e n t io n
I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
West Virginia
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests





Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
1 out of 1 
test
2 out of 3 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not pass Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 2 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
4 total methods 
4 core 
0 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents 
Oct: not eligible
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9 N/A
One Level 2 lab





1 CDC, O ffice o f In fectious D iseases (O ID ), N ational C en ter for Em erg ing  and  Zo o n o tic  In fectious D iseases (N CEZID ); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data : 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, O ID, N C EZID ; 2008 data : 1/08-9/08; 2009 data : 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data : 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, O ID, N C EZID ; 2008 data : 3/08; 2009 data : 7/09; 2010 data : 4/10 and  6/10
4 CDC, O ffice o f Pub lic  Health  Prepared ness and  Response, D iv is ion  o f S ta te  and  Local Readiness; 2008 data : 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data : 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data : 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, O ffice o f N o n co m m u n icab le  Diseases, In jury and  Environ m en ta l H ealth  (O N D IEH ), N ationa l C en ter fo r Env iron m en ta l H ealth  (N CEH ); 2009 data : 9/14/09; 2010 data : 12/31/10
6 CDC, O N D IEH , NCEH; 2009 data : 1 / I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 / I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, O N D IEH , NCEH; 2009 data : 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, O N D IEH , NCEH; 2009 data : 8/24/09 and  10/5/09; 2010 data : 9/13/10
9 CDC, O N D IEH , NCEH; 2009 data : 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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West Virginia
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Charleston, WV
2. Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in the District of Columbia, 








'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories
LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for 
biological agents'
Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests






Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
6 out of 6 
tests
4 out of 4 
tests
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state Is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Passed Did not pass
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
























Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 1 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6 
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core
10 total methods 
6 core 
4 additional
methods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
Aug: 14 out of 14 
agents
Oct: 1 out of 1 agent
Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 
during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise9
122 hours
(range: 71 to 126 
hours)
One Level 1 lab





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1 /I /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1 /I /10-12/31 /10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Wisconsin
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Metropolitan Statistical Area TAR Scores1
1. Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI
The jurisdictions for this MSA are located in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
2. Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, Wl
3. Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI





'CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








I aboratories identify and characterize disease agents, toxins, and other health threats found in clinical specimens, food, or other substances. Because 
L th e  information provided by these laboratories is essential for rapid detection and response to public health threats, these resources play a critical role 
in emergency response planning and activities. The Laboratory Response Network managed by CDC is a group of local, state, federal, and international 
laboratories that use unique testing capabilities to confirm high priority biological and chemical agents. The PulseNet laboratory network coordinated by 
CDC performs testing to identify common disease-causing bacteria in food. Data related to these laboratory resources are below; see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the data points.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities 2008 2009 2010
Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network (LRN) for 
biological agents
Evaluating LRN capabilities 
through proficiency testing
Rapid identification of 
disease-causing bacteria by 
PulseNet laboratories




Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
• Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working 
days
N/A
1 reference 2 reference 
lab labs
Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national 
laboratories2
1 out of 1 
test
1 out of 1 
test
LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations 
Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill3
Note: One LRN laboratory In DC and in each state is eligible to participate in 
this drill, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.
Did not 
participate Passed
Rapidly identified E. co//0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4
• Samples for which state performed tests
















Participation in Laboratory 
Response Network for 
chemical agents (LRN-C)
Evaluating LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
proficiency testing
Assessing LRN-C laboratory 
capabilities through 
exercises
LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is 
exposed to chemical agents5
Note: There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most 
capabilities. See appendix 1.
One Level 3 lab One Level 3 lab
Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 
and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents6
• Core methods successfully demonstrated (there were six core N/Amethods in 2009 and eight core methods in 2010)
• Additional methods successfully demonstrated (there were up to 
six additional methods available in 2009 and up to five in 2010)
LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly 
during LRN exercise7 Passed
Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in 
unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop 
Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise8
N/A
Flours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory 





1 CDC, Office of Infectious Diseases (OID), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID); 2008 data: 9/30/08; 2009 data: 12/31/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
2 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 1/08-9/08; 2009 data: 1/1/09-12/31/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
3 CDC, OID, NCEZID; 2008 data: 3/08; 2009 data: 7/09; 2010 data: 4/10 and 6/10
4 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of State and Local Readiness; 2008 data: 8/31/07-8/9/08; 2009 data: 8/10/08-8/9/09; 2010 data: 8/10/09-8/9/10
5 CDC, Office of Noncommunicable Diseases, Injury and Environmental Health (ONDIEH), National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH); 2009 data: 9/14/09; 2010 data: 12/31/10
6 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/1 /09-9/14/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
7 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 2/10/09-11/9/09; 2010 data: 1/1/10-12/31/10
8 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 8/24/09 and 10/5/09; 2010 data: 9/13/10
9 CDC, ONDIEH, NCEH; 2009 data: 1/13/09-1/18/09; 2010 data: 5/18/10-5/22/10
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Wyoming
A  II states and localities funded by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement have plans for receiving, distributing, and 
/»dispensing assets from CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Assets include large quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical supplies to 
supplement state and local public health agencies in a large-scale public health emergency. To ensure continued readiness, CDC conducts annual 
technical assistance reviews (TAR) of state plans. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as either critical or important 
planning steps within a variety of functions. State TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below. (See scoring note at bottom of page.)
CDC Technical Assistance Review (TAR) State Scores1
Overall Score
• Function: Developing a Plan with SNS Elements
• Function: Management of SNS
• Function: Requesting SNS
• Function: Communications Plan (Tactical)
• Function: Public Information and Communication
• Function: Security
• Function: Receipt, Stage, Store
• Function: Controlling Inventory
• Function: Repackaging
• Function: Distribution
• Function: Dispensing Prophylaxis
• Function: Hospital/Alternate Care Facilities Coordination
• Function: Training, Exercise, and Evaluation
Assessing plans 
to receive, distribute, 
and dispense medical 

















The Cities Readiness Initiative of the Strategic National Stockpile also enhances preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, cities, and municipalities) and can 
extend across state borders. TARs are conducted annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for the 
entire MSA. TAR scores for the past three years are listed in the table below for each MSA. (See scoring note at bottom of page.) See appendix 2 fora 
detailed listing of the jurisdictions in each MSA and their individual scores.
Cities Readiness Initiative 




1 CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-08 data: 8/10/2007- 8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009 performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-8/9/2010 performance period
Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated performance in an acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher for 2009­
2010.








Appendix 1 : Explanation of Fact Sheet 
Data Points
The data points that appear in the individual fact sheets and summary tables are bulleted below, 
followed by an explanation of their significance.
Laboratories: Biological Capabilities
Partic ipation  in Laboratory  R esponse  N e tw ork  (LRN) for b io log ica l a ge n ts
CDC manages the LRN, a group of local, state, federal, and international laboratories. CDC provides 
funding through the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement to the 50 
states and four localities to establish and maintain LRN biological public health laboratories. In 
addition to the laboratories that receive PHEP funding, other laboratories that participate in the LRN 
include state and locally funded public health laboratories as well as federal, military, international, 
agricultural, veterinary, food, and environmental testing laboratories. LRN provides a critical 
laboratory infrastructure to detect, characterize, and communicate about confirmed threat agents, 
decreasing the time needed to begin the response to an intentional act or naturally occurring 
outbreak.
• LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for biological agents
LRN biological laboratories are designated as national, reference, or sentinel laboratories. National 
laboratories, including those at CDC, are responsible for specialized strain characterizations, 
bioforensics, select agent activity, and handling highly infectious agents. Reference laboratories 
perform tests to detect and confirm the presence of a threat agent. Sentinel laboratories are 
commercial, private, and hospital-based laboratories that test clinical specimens in order to either 
rule out suspicion of a biological threat agent or ship to reference or national laboratories for 
further testing. The fact sheets present CDC estimates for the total number of LRN reference and 
national laboratories that have selected to test for one or more biological threat agents supported 
by the LRN program office at CDC. For some states and localities, the total number of reference 
laboratories consists exclusively of public health laboratories, as this is the only type of laboratory 
that is a part of the LRN for these states. In contrast, other states and localities have both public 
health and other types of laboratories (federal, military, agricultural, veterinary, food, and 
environmental testing laboratories) that are a part of the LRN. For these states and localities, both 
public health and non-public health laboratories are included in the total.
Evaluating LRN laboratory capabilities through proficiency testing
• Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories
CDC proficiency tests are composed of a number of unknown samples that are tested in order to 
evaluate the abilities of LRN reference and/or national biological laboratories to receive, test, and 
report on one or more suspected biological agents. If a laboratory is unable to successfully test for 
an agent within a specified period of time and report results, then the laboratory will not pass the 
proficiency test. If a laboratory fails a proficiency test, it is required to go through remediation 
proficiency testing to ensure that any problems are corrected.
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If a laboratory does not pass remediation testing, then it can no longer perform testing in the LRN 
for that specific agent. The fact sheets present the total number of proficiency tests passed by 
reference and/or national laboratories during each year. In states and localities with public health 
and other types of LRN laboratories (federal, military, agricultural, veterinary, food, and 
environmental testing laboratories) participating in proficiency testing, all proficiency test results 
are presented. The results include first-round proficiency tests only; follow-up remediation tests 
are not included in the totals.
A sse ss in g  LRN labora to ry  com petency  and  reporting  th ro u gh  exercises
• LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations Center within 2 hours during LRN 
notification drill. (Note: One LRN laboratory in DC and in each state is eligible to participate in this drill, 
with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, where two can participate.)
LRN notification drills ensure that biological laboratories can contact the CDC Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) to report results to EOC watch staff and duty officers within 2 hours of 
obtaining a result. These drills are associated with participation in a specific proficiency test; 
laboratories that cannot participate in the test are excluded from this drill. Reasons for non­
participation in the proficiency test include the following: laboratory does not test for agent, 
facility renovations or permit issues prevent laboratory from accepting samples, and laboratory 
has equipment issues.
Rapid  identification o f  d isease -causin g  bacteria by  Pu lseN et laboratorie s
States and the District of Columbia must be able to detect and determine the extent and scope of 
potential outbreaks and to minimize their impacts. The intent of this performance measure is to 
determine if a laboratory can rapidly receive, identify, and report disease-causing bacteria within 4 
working days of receiving the samples. Laboratories in the PulseNet network use CDC's pulsed-field 
gel electrophoresis (PFGE) protocols to rapidly identify specific strains of Escherichia coli O157:H7 and 
Listeria monocytogenes. The 4 working-day timeframe of the performance measure allows states and 
the District of Columbia to demonstrate their ability to analyze samples and submit results to the 
PulseNet database. This database is used by the PulseNet network (consisting of local, state and 
federal public health and food regulatory agency laboratories), which is coordinated by CDC.
• Rapidly identified E. coli 0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)
-  Samples for which state performed tests
-  Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%)
• Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)
-  Samples for which state performed tests
-  Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%)










Partic ipation  in Laboratory  R esponse  N e tw ork  for chem ical a ge n ts  (LRN-C)
CDC manages the LRN, a group of local, state, federal, and international laboratories. The LRN provides 
a critical laboratory infrastructure to detect, characterize, and communicate about confirmed threat 
agents, decreasing the time needed to begin the response to an intentional act or accidental 
exposure.
• LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is exposed to chemical agents (Note:
There are three LRN-C levels, with Level 1 having the most advanced capabilities.)
-  Level 1 laboratories are national surge capacity laboratories that maintain the capabilities of
Level 2 and Level 3 laboratories, can test for an expanded number of agents using highly
automated analysis methods, maintain an adequate supply of materials to analyze 1,000 
patient samples for each method, and can operate 24/7 for an extended period of time.
- Level 2 laboratories maintain the capabilities of Level 3 laboratories, can test for a limited
panel of toxic chemical agents, and stock materials and supplies for the analysis of at least
500 patient samples for each qualified analysis method.
- Level 3 laboratories work with hospitals, poison control centers, and first responders within 
their jurisdictions to maintain competency in clinical specimen collection, storage, and 
shipment.
Eva lua tin g  LRN-C  labora to ry  capab ilities th ro u gh  proficiency te sting
• Total number of methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly 
detect chemical agents
LRN methods can help determine how widespread an incident was, identify who does/does not 
need long-term treatment, assist with non-emergency medical guidance, and help law 
enforcement officials determine the origin of the agent. Level 1 and Level 2 laboratories undergo 
proficiency testing to determine if they can rapidly detect and measure chemical agents that can 
cause severe health effects.
• Core methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect 
chemical agents
For 2010, CDC identified eight core methods for detecting and measuring chemical agents, and 
conducted testing to determine a laboratory's proficiency in these methods (there were six core 
methods in 2009). The core methods are significant as they offer new technical fundamentals in 
the methods that provide the foundation of LRN-C laboratory capabilities. This report presents 
final proficiency testing results as the number of these core methods successfully demonstrated 
by the laboratories in each state or locality. However, it should be noted that the states and 
localities with Level 1 and Level 2 laboratories that are not proficient in all core methods may 
have completed extensive work in the two steps that precede proficiency testing: training and 
validation in the core methods.
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• Additional methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect 
chemical agents
In addition to proficiency in core methods, certain LRN laboratories demonstrate proficiency in 
additional methods. These methods build upon the foundation established by the core methods, 
providing modifications to core techniques which allow for laboratories to test for additional 
agents and thereby expand their testing capabilities. Level 1 laboratories are required to gain 
proficiency in these additional methods, while Level 2 laboratories may choose to do so or not.
In 2010, there were five additional methods in which Level 1 laboratories should have 
demonstrated proficiency, and up to four additional methods in which Level 2 laboratories could 
have chosen to become proficient. In 2009, there were six additional methods for Level 1 
laboratories and up to five additional methods for Level 2 laboratories, depending on the state or 
locality needs. (There was a reduction in the number of additional methods from 2009 to 2010, 
since one of the 2009 additional methods became a core method in 2010). A successful 
demonstration in the testing indicates ongoing proficiency. The figures presented in the fact 
sheets represent the number of additional methods for which laboratories in the state or locality 
demonstrated proficiency. Laboratories may have trained in additional methods, and/or 
undergone validation for additional methods, which are steps that precede proficiency testing.
A sse ss in g  LRN-C  labora to ry  capab ilities th ro u gh  exercises
• LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly during LRN exercise
This exercise evaluates the ability of a laboratory to collect relevant samples for clinical chemical 
analysis and ship those samples in compliance with International Air Transport Association 
regulations. At least one laboratory located in each PHEP-funded state or locality should 
participate and pass. For states or localities with multiple laboratories, all results are reported.
• Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in unknown samples during the LRN 
Emergency Response Pop Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise
This exercise tests a laboratory's emergency response capabilities focusing on a laboratory's 
ability to detect, identify, and quantify unknown agents. This exercise also tests the laboratory's 
emergency contact process and its ability to report results. To participate in a PopPT exercise, the 
laboratory must have attained a "Qualified" status for the method. To attain "Qualified" status, a 
laboratory must have completed training, the validation exercise, and passed at least one 
scheduled PT exercise. Laboratories participating in the PopPT exercise are called the day before 
the exercise, are sent a minimum of 10 unknown samples, and must test these samples within a 
certain number of hours (depending on the methods needed).
• Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory during the LRN Surge Capacity 
Exercise
This exercise demonstrates the ability of each Level 1 laboratory to test and report on 500 
samples (a total of 5000 samples) on a 24/7 basis as would be required by a large scale chemical 
incident. The response time was determined from the time the 500 samples were received until 
the time the last test result was reported to CDC.










A sse ss in g  p lan s to  receive, d istribute, and  d ispen se  m edical a sse ts from  the S trategic  
N ational Stockp ile
The CDC Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, 
vaccines, antiviral drugs, and other life-saving medical supplies that are placed in strategic locations 
around the nation to supplement and resupply state and local public health agencies in the event of a 
large-scale public health emergency.
• Technical Assistance Review Scores -  National Average for States
Every state and directly funded locality has plans for receiving, distributing, and dispensing SNS 
assets. CDC conducts state TARs to assess these plans on an annual basis to ensure continued 
readiness. Using a scale from 0 to 100, a CDC state TAR score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008­
09 indicated that a state performed in an acceptable range in its plan to receive, distribute, and 
dispense medical assets from the SNS. The acceptable threshold score has increased to 79 or 
higher for 2009-2010. Areas of assessment for the TAR focus on key elements that are regarded as 
either critical or important planning steps within a variety of functions. The 13 functions are the 
following:
Developing a Plan with SNS Elements. A comprehensive, written plan is essential to facilitate the receipt, 
distribution, and dispensing of SNS assets quickly and efficiently. This plan should be incorporated as part of 
a state's comprehensive emergency operations plan.
Management of SNS. The way a state, region, or community manages its response to a public health 
emergency is considered a program management and command-and-control function. Command and 
control is how political leadership, emergency management, public health, law enforcement, and other 
groups coordinate their response to an emergency.
Requesting SNS. The decision to deploy SNS assets will be a collaborative effort among local, state, and 
federal officials. It will start at a local level when officials identify a potential or actual situation they believe 
has the potential to threaten the health of their community. SNS assets are requested from CDC by the 
affected state's governor (or the governor's designee).
Communications Plan (Tactical). The availability of robust and redundant communication systems is 
critical to coordinating response functions during an emergency. Effective and timely communications 
between emergency response staffs, operation centers, receiving sites, points of dispensing, and hospitals 
will be needed to meet and resolve the demands of a mass distribution and dispensing emergency. The 
choice of communication support devices and support of technologies used to tether state, regional, and 
local networks will be key elements in meeting the need for timely flow of assets to distribution points, 
dispensing centers and health care facilities.
Public Information and Communication. During an emergency where medical countermeasure assets are 
to be dispensed to the public, effective and timely public health communications are needed to ensure the 
public is informed and guided to appropriate locations to receive them. The development and dissemination 
of effective messages, methods, and materials to inform, educate, and mobilize the public will be critical to 
the success of a mass dispensing effort.
Security. The security of the medical countermeasures and safety of staff involved in the receipt, 
distribution, and dispensing operations is essential. The arrival and transport of scarce resources will be
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newsworthy and may draw attention from persons unwilling to wait for the organized dispensing of 
prophylactic or treatment medicines. The development of a comprehensive security plan through 
coordination with law enforcement is essential to maintaining control and order during this period.
Receipt, Stage, and Store. The size, location and characteristics of warehouse facilities used to receive, 
stage, and store medical countermeasures are important factors that will determine the effectiveness of an 
emergency response. CDC has established minimum criteria for sites designated to receive, stage, and store 
federal assets received from the SNS. The development of distribution strategies, site-specific plans, and the 
assignment and training of staff will determine the ability of jurisdictions to meet the demand for 
distribution of assets to local populations.
Controlling Inventory. State and local jurisdictions must possess a robust inventory management system to 
monitor the receipt of medical countermeasures, track their distribution, and record dispensing during a 
public health emergency. SNS inventory must be properly apportioned and configured in the quantities 
necessary for points of dispensing and health care facilities to successfully respond in an emergency.
Repackaging. Repackaging of bulk medications for public dispensing remains an SNS function that may be 
needed in an emergency. In the past, a significant amount of planning and preparation was required to 
repackage bulk oral drugs contained in the SNS before dispensing them to the public. Much of that effort is 
no longer necessary since the majority of oral medicines in the SNS now come in prepackaged unit-of-use 
regimens. However, states may still have to repackage bulk items under some circumstances.
Distribution. The distribution function refers to the physical delivery of SNS assets from the receipt, stage, 
and store (RSS) facility to dispensing sites, treatment centers, and regional distribution sites. States are 
responsible for developing distribution networks that account for challenges and barriers unique to their 
areas. Clear communication between RSS and local and regional planners is paramount to a good 
distribution plan.
Dispensing Prophylaxis. The SNS dispensing function was originally designed with the focus of providing 
initial prophylaxis to 100% of the population within 48 hours (U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Target 
Capabilities List performance measure for mass dispensing). Dispensing planning, however, should be flexible 
and scalable so that the infrastructure built for meeting this capability can be used for any incident as part of 
an all hazards plan.
Hospital and Alternate Care Facilities Coordination. A large-scale emergency event can quickly 
overwhelm available resources at hospitals and other acute care providers. This function stresses the need 
for and measures the degree of coordination among public health, emergency management, and hospitals 
or alternative care sites to manage and respond to material needs at healthcare facilities.
Training, Exercise, and Evaluation. This function serves to highlight and document the development of 
emergency response training and exercise and evaluation programs that are compliant with guidelines set 
forth by the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. Emergency response exercises are 
intrinsic to the transition of plans to operational response.
• Technical Assistance Review (TAR) Scores -  National Average for the 72 Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs) in CDC's Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI)
CRI focuses on enhancing preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan areas, where more 
than half of the U.S. population resides. A CRI location is an MSA composed of multiple counties 
based on U.S. Census Bureau data. MSAs can consist of one or more jurisdictions (e.g., counties, 
cities, and municipalities) and can extend across state borders. Local TARs are conducted 
annually in each jurisdiction and those scores are then combined to compute an average score for 
the entire MSA.









Appendix 2: Cities Readiness Initiative Technical 
Assistance Review Scores by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
and Individual Planning Jurisdictions
The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI), a program of the Division of Strategic National Stockpile within CDC's Office of Public 
Health Preparedness and Response, focuses on enhancing preparedness in the nation's major metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs) where more than 50% of the U.S. population resides. Through the CRI program, state and large metropolitan area 
public health departments have developed plans to respond to a large-scale bioterrorist event within 48 hours. The initial 
CRI planning scenario was based on a response to a large-scale anthrax attack.
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines MSAs by one or more geographical jurisdictions (e.g., cities, 
counties and municipalities). Occasionally, MSAs extend across state borders, resulting in the representation of several 
states within one MSA. Technical assistance review (TARs) are conducted in each public health planning jurisdiction 
associated with those cities, counties, or municipalities. Some cities, counties and municipalities within the OMB-defined 
MSA were consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure in 2009-10 (see scores with superscripts). 
Jurisdictional scores are combined to compute an average score for the entire CRI MSA. CDC is responsible for conducting 
25% of the TARs (see scores with asterisks) while the state is responsible for the other 75%. The average MSA and individual 
jurisdiction scores are provided in Table 1 for each of the 72 MSAs.
Scoring Note: On a scale of 0 to 100, a TAR score of 69 or higher in 2007-08 and 2008-09 indicated that a jurisdiction performed within an 
acceptable range. The acceptable threshold score increased to 79 or higher in 2009-10.
Table 1: CRI Technical Assistance Review (TAR) Scores by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); 2007-2010










MSA Score: 32 54 76
Bibb County, AL: 32* 52* 741
Blount County, AL: 32* 49* 741
Alabama (AL) 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL








St. Clair County, AL: 31* 53* 741
Shelby County, AL: 30* 59* 741
Walker County, AL: 33* 49* 741
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
Alaska (AK) 
Anchorage, AK
MSA Score: 74 92 66
Anchorage Municipality, AK: 74* 92* 92*;**
Matanuska-Susitna Borough, AK: TAR not performed TAR not performed 39*
Arizona (AZ) 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
MSA Score: 72 89 95
Maricopa County, AZ: 92* 96* 96*;**
Pinal County, AZ: 52* 82* 94*
* CDC co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
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MSA Score: 51 52 79
Faulkner County, AR 36* 54* 77*
Arkansas (AR) Grant County, AR 69 63 87
Little Rock-North Little Rock, Lonoke County, AR 43 54 76
AR Perry County, AR 34 41 72
Pulaski County, AR 63* 49* 80*
Saline County, AR 59 49 79
California (CA) MSA Score: 22* 73 74
Fresno, CA Fresno County, CA: 22* 73 74
California (CA) MSA Score: 82 91 91
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Los Angeles County, CA: 81* 92* 92*;**
Ana, CA Orange County, CA: 82 90* 90*;**
California (CA) MSA Score: 73 85* 93
Riverside-San Bernardino- Riverside County, CA: 91 91 95*.**
Ontario, CA San Bernardino County, CA: 54 74* 91
MSA Score: 60 75 94
California (CA) El Dorado County, CA 81 79 95
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade-- Placer County, CA 38 43 88
Roseville, CA Sacramento County, CA 40* 87* 91*
Yolo County, CA 80 90 100*
California (CA) MSA Score: 82 96 96
San Diego-Carlsbad-San 
Marcos, CA San Diego, CA: 82 96* 96*;**




Alameda County, CA: 91 96 96**
Contra Costa County, CA: 68 84* 83*
Marin County, CA: 71 79 72*
San Francisco County, CA: 69 84 96
San Mateo County, CA: 73 86 95
California (CA) MSA Score: 77 91 91
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa San Benito County, CA: 81 92 92**
Clara, CA Santa Clara County, CA: 73* 90 90**
MSA Score: 90 85 78
Boulder County, CO 89 89 72*
Adams County, CO 87* 89 901
Arapahoe County, CO 87* 89 901
Broomfield County, CO 87 74* 48
Colorado (CO) 
Denver-Aurora, CO
Clear Creek County, CO 95 91 73*
Denver County, CO 90* 89 86
Douglas County, CO 87* 89 901
Elbert County, CO 91 81 67*
Gilpin County, CO 96 89* 782
Jefferson County, CO 96 89* 782
Park County, CO 79 67 TAR not performed
1;2 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
* CDC co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.









M S A TAR  Scores for M S A s  and  In d iv idu a l Jurisd ictions
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
(8/10/2007-8/9/2008 (8/10/2008-8/9/2009 (8/10/2009-8/9/2010
performance period) performance period) performance period)












Tolland County, CT 42 44 88
Connecticut (CT) MSA Score: 70 50* 82
New Haven-Milford, CT New Haven County, CT: 70 50 82
Delaware (DE) Dover, DE: 97 98 98
Dover, DE Kent County, DE: 97* 98* 98*;**




Broward County, FL 78* 93 93**
Miami-Dade County, FL 93* 96 96**
Palm Beach County, FL 91 92* 92*;**
MSA Score: 89 95 95
Florida (FL) 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL
Lake County, FL 89 98 98**
Orange County, FL 86* 96* 96*;**
Osceola County, FL 71 90 90**
Seminole County, FL 77* 95 95**
MSA Score: 87 93 94
Florida (FL) Hernando County, FL 90* 95 95**
Tampa-St. Petersburg- Hillsborough County, FL 89 92* 92*;**
Clearwater, FL Pasco County, FL 81* 95 95**
Pinellas County, FL 86 89 92**
MSA Score: 59 79 88
Barrow County, GA 40* 79 1001
Bartow County, GA 100 84* 882
Butts County, GA 24* TAR not performed 793;*
Carroll County, GA 24* TAR not performed 793;*
Cherokee County, GA 78 80* 954
Clayton County, GA 82 70* 918
Cobb County, GA 92 95 956;**
Coweta County, GA 24* TAR not performed 793;*




DeKalb County, GA 56* 74 93
Douglas County, GA 92 95 956;**
Fayette County, GA 24* TAR not performed 793;*
Forsyth County, GA 88 TAR not performed 955;*
Fulton County, GA 27* 46 86*
Gwinnett County, GA 89 95 919
Haralson County, GA 100 76* 882
Heard County, GA 24* 69* 793;*
Henry County, GA 24* TAR not performed 79*
Jasper County, GA 93 93 9311;**
Lamar County, GA 24* 57 793;*
Meriwether County, GA 24* 49 793;*
*  C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
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Newton County, GA 89 91 919
Paulding County, GA 100 87* 882
Pickens County, GA 78 78* 954
Pike County, GA 24* TAR not performed 793;*
Rockdale County, GA 89 96 919
Spalding County, GA 24* TAR not performed 793;*
Walton County, GA 40* 84 1001
1 through 11 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
Hawaii (HI) MSA Score: 51 76 80
Honolulu, HI Honolulu County, HI: 51* 76* 80
MSA Score: 75 45 66
Ada County, ID 75* 32 501;*
Idaho (ID)
Boise City-Nampa, ID
Boise County, ID 75* 32 501;*
Canyon County, ID 75 54* 772
Gem County, ID 75 54* 772
Owyhee County, ID 75 54* 772
1;2 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 80 92 94
City of Chicago, IL 94* 99* 99*;**
Cook County, IL 77* 94* 94*;**
DeKalb County, IL 77 94 94**
DuPage County, IL 92* 100* 100“




Kane County, IL 93* 99 99**
Kendall County, IL 71 95 95**
Lake County, IL 95 99* 99*;**
McHenry County, IL 80 94 94**
Will County, IL 99 97 97**
Jasper County, IN 66 89 92
Lake County, IN 52 99* TAR not performed
Newton County, IN 64 70 78
Porter County, IN 91 76* 85
Kenosha County, WI 78 87 95
MSA Score: 59 75 85
Marshall County, IL 52 69 79
Illinois (IL) Peoria County, IL 46* 74* 88*
Peoria, IL Stark County, IL 75 76 84*
Tazewell County, IL 69 85* 94*
Woodford County, IL 54 72 80
MSA Score: 83 86 95
Boone County, IN 69 82 95*
Indiana (IN) Brown County, IN 91 74 88
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN Hamilton County, IN 89* 100 100
Hancock County, IN 86 88 96*
Hendricks County, IN 86 92 98
* C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.

















Johnson County, IN 86 88 97
Marion County, IN 95* 96 100
Morgan County, IN 68 76 92
Putnam County, IN 74 79 88
Shelby County, IN 89 83* 95
MSA Score: 54 77 88
Dallas County, IA 67 76 97
Iowa (IA)
Des Moines-West Des Moines, 
IA
Guthrie County, IA 48 74 82
Madison County, IA 35 79 84
Polk County, IA 85 75 93*
Warren County, IA 33 79 82
MSA Score: 59 91 90
Kansas (KS) 
Wichita, KS
Butler County, KS 53* 94 94
Harvey County, KS 51 86 84
Sedgwick County, KS 80 90* 90*;**
Sumner County, KS 51 92 92**
MSA Score: 68 73 79
Bullitt County, KY 54 51 64
Henry County, KY 75 73 721
Jefferson County, KY 53* 76* 84*
Meade County, KY 75 85 832
Nelson County, KY 75 85 832
Kentucky(KY) 
Louisville, KY-IN
Oldham County, KY 61* 51 58
Shelby County, KY 75 73 721
Spencer County, KY 75 73 721
Trimble County, KY 75 73 721
Clark County, IN 91 96* 100
Floyd County, IN 56 68 88*
Harrison County, IN 43 71 86
Washington County, IN 70 76 89
1;2 The jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: TAR not performed 89 91
Ascension Parish, LA TAR not performed 88* 911;*
East Baton Rouge Parish, LA TAR not performed 88* 911;*
East Feliciana Parish, LA TAR not performed 88* 911;*
Louisiana (LA) 
Baton Rouge, LA
Iberville Parish, LA TAR not performed 88* 911;*
Livingston Parish, LA TAR not performed 92* 922"**
Pointe Coupee Parish, LA TAR not performed 88* 911;*
St. Helena Parish, LA TAR not performed 92* 922"**
West Baton Rouge Parish, LA TAR not performed 88* 911;*
West Feliciana Parish, LA TAR not performed 88* 911;*




MSA Score: 29 93 93
Jefferson Parish, LA TAR not performed 91* 911;*;**
Orleans Parish, LA TAR not performed 91* 911;*;**
Plaquemines Parish, LA TAR not performed 91* 911;*;**
* C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
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St. Bernard Parish, LA TAR not performed 91* 911;*;**
St. Charles Parish, LA TAR not performed 97* 972;*;**
St. John the Baptist Parish, LA TAR not performed 97* 972;*;**
St. Tammany Parish, LA TAR not performed 92* 92*;**
1;2 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 25 62 87
Maine (ME) Cumberland County, ME 25* 62* 87*1
Portland-South Portland- Sagadahoc County, ME 25* 62* 87*1
Biddeford, ME York County, ME 25* 62* 87*1
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 77 89 92
Anne Arundel County, MD 86 88 94*
Baltimore County, MD 74* 93* 93*;**
Maryland (MD) Carroll County, MD 85 84 92
Baltimore-Towson, MD Harford County, MD 79 87 91
Howard County, MD 75 89* 93
Queen Anne's County, MD 81 87* 90
Baltimore City, MD 58* 91* 91*;**
MSA Score: 82 85 79
Calvert County, MD 81 93* 93*;**
Charles County, MD 80 91 91**
Frederick County, MD 96 97* 97*;**
Montgomery County, MD 86* 92* 92*;**
Prince George's County, MD 79* 88* 80*
Arlington County, VA 86 97* 97*;**
Clarke County, VA 82 61* 922;*
Fairfax County, VA 94* 80 864
Fauquier County, VA 77 87 90
National Capital Region 
Washington-Arlington-
Loudoun County, VA 91 95* 96*;**
Prince William County, VA 62 78 501;*
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Spotsylvania County, VA 94* 97 463
Stafford County, VA 94* 97 463
Warren County, VA 82 61* 922;*
Alexandria City, VA 94 91 91**
Fairfax City, VA 94* 80 864
Falls Church City, VA 94* 80 864
Fredericksburg City, VA 94* 97 463
Manassas City, VA 62 78 501;*
Manassas Park City, VA 62 78 501;*
Jefferson County, WV 29 54 80
1;2;3;4 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure




Essex County, MA 72 67 59
Norfolk County, MA 76 68 68
Plymouth County, MA 83 79 94
* C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.




















Suffolk County, MA 84* 96 100*
Middlesex County, MA 76 68 79
Rockingham County, NH 48 54 71
Strafford County, NH 90 89 88
MSA Score







Wayne County, MI 46* 62* 85*
Michigan (MI) Lapeer County, MI 76 86 88
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI Livingston County, MI 86 91 89
Macomb County, MI 80* 90 90**
Oakland County, MI 93 90* 97
St. Clair County, MI 90 93 99
MSA Score: 79 88 88
City of Minneapolis, MN 89* 97* 97*.**
Anoka County, MN 92 92 92**
Carver County, MN 74 87 85*
Chisago County, MN 69 90 90**
Dakota County, MN 86 96 96**
Minnesota (MN) Hennepin County, MN 94* 98* 98*;**
Minneapolis-St. Paul- Isanti County, MN 50 74 62*
Bloomington, MN-WI Ramsey County, MN 79* 92* 92*.**
Scott County, MN 80 84 89*
Sherburne County, MN 65 86 73*
Washington County, MN 74 82 73*
Wright County, MN 85 90 90**
Pierce County, WI 87 82 91
St. Croix County, WI 82 78 92
MSA Score: 88 93 93
Copiah County, MS 88* 93* 931;*;**
Mississippi (MS) 
Jackson, MS
Hinds County, MS 88* 93* 931;*;**
Madison County, MS 88* 93* 931;*;**
Rankin County, MS 88* 93* 931;*;**
Simpson County, MS 88* 93* 931;*;**
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 73 89 93
Kansas City Proper, MO 80* 93* 93*.**
Bates County, MO 74 93 93**
Caldwell County, MO 87 94 94**
Cass County, MO 77 88 94
Missouri (MO) Clay County, MO 78* 91*
91*.**
Kansas City, MO-KS Clinton County, MO 88 93 93**
Jackson County, MO 48* 82 98*
Lafayette County, MO 84 88 95
Platte County, MO 77 86 99
Ray County, MO 80 93 93**
Franklin County, KS: 47 80 81
* CDC co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
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M S A TAR  Scores for M S A s  and  In d iv idu a l Jurisd ictions
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
(8/10/2007-8/9/2008 (8/10/2008-8/9/2009 (8/10/2009-8/9/2010
performance period) performance period) performance period)
Johnson County, KS 71* 92* 92*.**
Leavenworth County, KS 76 91 91**
Linn County, KS 67 98 98**
Miami County, KS 43 74* 82
Wyandotte County, KS 87* 94 94**
MSA Score: 76 84 87
Crawford County, MO TAR not performed TAR not performed 931
Franklin County, MO 78 84 931
Jefferson County, MO 84 90 90**
Lincoln County, MO 79 80 80
St. Charles County, MO 77* 71* 68*
St. Louis County, MO 85* 95* 95*.**
Warren County, MO 67 95 95**
Missouri (MO) 
St. Louis, MO-IL
Washington County, MO 91 94 94**
St. Louis City, MO 75* 78* 87*
Bond County, IL 89 87 96
Calhoun County, IL 78 70 85
Clinton County, IL 88 82 88
Jersey County, IL 70 68 88
Macoupin County, IL 47 88 88
Madison County, IL 57* 86* 93*
Monroe County, IL 78 82 59*
St. Clair County, IL 73* 92* 92*.**
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
Montana (MT) 
Billings, MT
MSA Score: 80 55 75
Carbon County, MT: TAR not performed 21 54*
Yellowstone County, MT: 80* 89* 96*
MSA Score: 44 84 95
Cass County, NE 33 78* 961
Dodge County, NE 41 91* 932;*
Douglas County, NE 51* 92* 97
Nebraska (NE) 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA
Sarpy County, NE 33 78* 961
Saunders County, NE 41 91* 932;*
Washington County, NE 41 91* 932;*
Harrison County, IA 58 83 95*
Mills County, IA 49 79 96
Pottawattamie County, IA 49 75 95
1;2 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
Nevada (NV) MSA Score: 82 87 92
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Clark County, NV: 82* 87* 92*
New Hampshire (NH) MSA Score: 75 78 87
Manchester-Nashua, NH Hillsborough County, NH: 75* 78* 87*
New Jersey (NJ) MSA Score: 78 88 93
Trenton-Ewing, NJ Mercer County, NJ: 78 88* 93*
* CDC co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.



















MSA Score: 26 89 37
City of Albuquerque, NM: TAR not performed 89* 37*
New Mexico (NM) Bernalillo County, NM: 26* TAR not performed TAR not performed
Albuquerque, NM Sandoval County, NM: 26* TAR not performed TAR not performed
Torrance County, NM: 26* TAR not performed TAR not performed
Valencia County, NM: 26* TAR not performed TAR not performed
MSA Score: 92 99 99
Albany County, NY: 99* 100 100**
New York (NY) Rensselaer County, NY: 81* 100 100**
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY Saratoga County, NY: 91 97 97**
Schenectady County, NY: 96 100* 100*;**
Schoharie County, NY: 91 100* 100*;**
New York (NY) 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY
MSA Score: 85 98 98
Erie County, NY: 91 97* 97*.**
Niagara County, NY: 79* 99 99**
MSA Score: 86 92 93
Bronx County, NY: 99* 100* 1001;***
Kings County, NY: 99* 100* 1001;***
New York County, NY: 99* 100* 1001;*;**
Queens County, NY: 99* 100* 1001;*;**
Richmond County, NY: 99* 100* 1001;*;**
Nassau County, NY: 98 100* 100*;**
Putnam County, NY: 95 100 100**
Rockland County, NY: 88* 98 98**
Suffolk County, NY: 91 99* 99*;**
Westchester County, NY: 77* 87 100
New York (NY) Bergen County, NJ: 82 89 84
New York-Northern New Essex County, NJ: 76 88 85
Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA Hudson County, NJ: 89 93 93
Hunterdon County, NJ: 86 93* 94
Middlesex County, NJ: 89* 96 98
Monmouth County, NJ: 83* 96 97
Morris County, NJ: 87 90* 91
Ocean County, NJ: 74 79 85
Passaic County, NJ: 71 81 80*
Somerset County, NJ: 76 87 83
Sussex County, NJ: 98 94 92
Union County, NJ: 82* 89 81
Pike County, PA: 40 55 89
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 63 66 80
North Carolina (NC) Anson County, NC: 83 53 87
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, Cabarrus County, NC: 85 77 79
NC-SC Gaston County, NC: 46 49 64
Mecklenburg County, NC: 60* 93* 93*.**
* CDC co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
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Union County, NC: 42 31 68
York County, SC: 60* 90* 90*;**
North Dakota (ND) 
Fargo, ND-MN
MSA Score: 70 71 89
Cass County, ND: 78* 79* 94*
Clay County, MN: 62* 63* 83*
MSA Score: 62 72 77
City of Cincinnati, OH 94 91 TAR not performed
Brown County, OH 71 79 TAR not performed
Butler County, OH 56* 63* 74*
Clermont County, OH 76* 89* TAR not performed
Hamilton County, OH 66 83 86*
Warren County, OH 37* 52* TAR not performed




Bracken County, KY 52 59 59
Campbell County, KY 58 72 771
Gallatin County, KY 43 59 552
Grant County, KY 58 72 771
Kenton County, KY 58 72 771
Pendleton County, KY 43 59 552
Dearborn County, IN 89 80 98
Franklin County, IN 61 TAR not performed 96
Ohio County, IN 75 84 89*
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 71 70 90
City of Cleveland, OH 92 89 93*
Ohio (OH) 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH
Cuyahoga County, OH 81 77 87*
Geauga County, OH 69 46 TAR not performed
Lake County, OH 67* 73* TAR not performed
Lorain County, OH 68* 77* TAR not performed
Medina County, OH 46* 57* TAR not performed
MSA Score: 52 62 82
Delaware County, OH 24* 47* 76
Fairfield County, OH 54* 55* 78
Ohio (OH) 
Columbus, OH
Franklin County, OH 78 86 89*
Licking County, OH 36* 66* 90
Madison County, OH 57 61 85
Morrow County, OH 54 63 90
Pickaway County, OH 56 58 67
Union County, OH 56 58 77*
MSA Score: 79 88 95
Oklahoma (OK) 
Oklahoma City, OK
Canadian County, OK 90 90 90
Cleveland County, OK 91* 79* 961
Grady County, OK 79 91 94*
Lincoln County, OK 86 93 962
* CDC co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.



















Logan County, OK 86 93 962
McClain County, OK 91* 79* 961
Oklahoma County, OK 35* 82* 92*
Pottawatomie County, OK 77 95* 98
1;2 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 58 73 90
Clackamas County, OR 37* 71 93
Columbia County, OR 50 64 76*
Oregon (OR) Multnomah County, OR 65* 88 83*
Portland-Vancouver- Washington County, OR 68 70* 95
Beaverton, OR-WA Yamhill County, OR 65 72* 99
Clark County, WA 59* 71* 911
Skamania County, WA 59* 71* 911
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 75 86 91
Bucks County, PA 82 96 96**
Chester County, PA 49 74* 98




Montgomery County, PA 35* 76* 91*
Philadelphia County, PA 98* 99 99**
New Castle County, DE 97* 98* 98*;**
Cecil County, MD 58* 73 84
Burlington County, NJ 81 93 86
Camden County, NJ 77 82* 78*
Gloucester County, NJ 88* 87 87
Salem County, NJ 76 86 86
MSA Score: 42 59 70
Allegheny County, PA 42* 59* 91*
Armstrong County, PA 42* TAR not performed 661;*
Pennsylvania (PA) 
Pittsburgh, PA
Beaver County, PA 42* TAR not performed 661;*
Butler County, PA 42* TAR not performed 661;*
Fayette County, PA 42* TAR not performed 661;*
Washington County, PA 42* TAR not performed 661;*
Westmoreland County, PA 42* TAR not performed 661;*
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 89 90 91
Bristol County, RI 89* 93* 931:“ *
Rhode Island, (RI) 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall 
River, R|-MA
Kent County, RI 89* 93* 931:“ *
Newport County, RI 89* 93* 931:“ *
Providence County, RI 89* 93* 931:“ *
Washington County, RI 89* 93* 931:“ *
Bristol County, MA 89* 74 80
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
South Carolina (SC) 
Columbia, SC
MSA Score: 83 90 90
Calhoun County, SC: 83* 90* 901:“ *
Fairfield County, SC: 83* 90* 901:“ *
*  C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
1 4 4  | Public Health Preparedness: 2011 State-by-State Update on Laboratory Capabilities and Response Readiness Planning










Kershaw County, SC 83* 90* 901:“ *
Lexington County, SC 83* 90* 901:“ *
Richland County, SC 83* 90* 901:“ *
Saluda County, SC 83* 90* 901:“ *
Newberry County, SC No Score 90* 901:“ *
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score 74 76 85
Lincoln County, SD 74* 67 83*
South Dakota (SD) McCook County, SD 74* 79* 851
Sioux Falls, SD Minnehaha County, SD 74* 79* 851
Turner County, SD 74* 79* 86
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score 72 80 86
Fayette County, TN 60 63* 89*;2
Shelby County, TN 59* 63* 94*
Tipton County, TN 60 63* 89*;2
Tennessee (TN) Crittenden County, AR 47 TAR not performed 51*
Memphis, TN-MS-AR DeSoto County, MS 87* 92* 921:“ *
Marshall County, MS 87* 92* 921:“ *
Tate County, MS 87* 92* 921:“ *
Tunica County, MS 87* 92* 921:“ *
1;2 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score 56 95 90
Cannon County, TN 56* 97* 1001;*
Cheatham County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
Davidson County, TN 56* 93* 95
Dickson County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
Hickman County, TN 56* 86* 82
Tennessee (TN) Macon County, TN 56* 97* 1001;*
Nashville-Davidson-- Robertson County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
Murfreesboro, TN Rutherford County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
Smith County, TN 56* 97* 1001;*
Sumner County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
Trousdale County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
Williamson County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
Wilson County, TN 56* 95* 872;*
1;2 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score 91 95 94
Collin County, TX 95* 96 95*
Texas (TX) Dallas County, TX 100* 100 92
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, Delta County, TX 91 88 88
TX Denton County, TX 98* 100 91*
Ellis County, TX 79 93 94
Hunt County, TX 91 87 94
* C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.



















Johnson County, TX 84 95 98
Kaufman County, TX 87 97 97
Parker County, TX 93 96 95
Rockwall County, TX 87 89 93
Tarrant County, TX 98* 99 94*
Wise County, TX 89 96 96
MSA Score: 79 88 85
City of Houston, TX: 70* 86* 71*
Austin County, TX: 67 86 86
Brazoria County, TX: 83 86 86




Fort Bend County, TX: 83* 92 84*
Galveston County, TX: 82 79 79
Harris County, TX: 93* 86* 80*
Liberty County, TX: 65 91 91
Montgomery County, TX: 86* 91* 91*
San Jacinto County, TX: 94 97 97
Waller County, TX: 65 86 86
MSA Score: 55 74 74
Atascosa County, TX 43 67 67
Bandera County, TX 43 64 65
Texas (TX) 
San Antonio, TX
Bexar County, TX 85* 97 82*
Comal County, TX 85 83 83
Guadalupe County, TX 45* 89 61*
Kendall County, TX 43 95 95
Medina County, TX 56 67 68
Wilson County, TX 43 28 67
MSA Score: 68 35 56
Utah (UT) Salt Lake County, UT 68* 60* 65*
Salt Lake County, UT Summit County, UT TAR not performed 28* 39*
Tooele County, UT TAR not performed 17 63*
MSA Score: 70 75 95
Vermont (VT) Chittenden County, VT 70* 75* 951;*
Burlington-South Burlington, Franklin County, VT 70* 75* 951;*
VT Grand Isle County, VT 70* 75* 951;*
1 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 89 86 86
Amelia County, VA 89 91* 771;*
Caroline County, VA 94* 97 46
Virginia (VA) Charles City County, VA 88 80* 912
Richmond, VA Chesterfield County, VA 95* 89* 914
Cumberland County, VA 89 91* 77*1
Dinwiddie County, VA 87 91* 915;*;**
Goochland County, VA 88 80* 912
* C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
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Hanover County, VA 88 80* 912
Henrico County, VA 88 88* 96
King and Queen County, VA 96* 86 793
King William County, VA 96* 86 793
Louisa County, VA 70 72 98
New Kent County, VA 88 80* 912
Powhatan County, VA 95* 89* 914
Prince George County, VA 87 91* 915“ *
Sussex County, VA 87 91* 915:“ *
Colonial Heights City, VA 95* 89* 914
Hopewell City, VA 87 91* 915“ *
Petersburg City, VA 87 91* 915:“ *
Richmond City, VA 85 59* 86*
1;2;3;4;5 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 86 78 86
Accomack County, VA 90* 91 913;**
Gloucester County, VA 96* 86 791
Isle of Wight County, VA 69 70* 812
James City County, VA 91* 71 844
Mathews County, VA 96* 86 791
Northampton County, VA 90* 91 913;**




York County, VA 91* 71 844
Chesapeake City, VA 89 84 100*
Hampton City, VA 77 83* 87
Newport News City, VA 91* 71 844
Norfolk City, VA 76 64* 92*
Poquoson City, VA 91* 71 844
Portsmouth City, VA 82 75 97*
Suffolk City, VA 69 70* 812
Virginia Beach City, VA 92 88 84
Williamsburg City, VA 91* 71 844
Currituck County, NC 77 70 67
1;2;3;4 These jurisdictions and their TAR scores are consolidated under a combined or regional public health structure
MSA Score: 68 75 77
Washington (WA) King County, WA 87* 91*
91*.**
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA Snohomish County, WA 44* 84 59*
Pierce County, WA 73 50* 82
MSA Score: 50 66 78
Boone County, WV 36 46 75
West Virginia (WV) Clay County, WV 41* 76 82
Charleston, WV Kanawha County, WV 70* 67* 71*
Lincoln County, WV 60 68 82
Putnam County, WV 43 71 82
Wisconsin (WI) MSA Score: 79 83 88
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West City of Milwaukee, WI: 72* 86 80*
* C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse , 
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.




















Allis, WI Milwaukee County, WI: 72* 86 89
Ozaukee County, WI: 89 89 93
Washington County, WI: 88 84 95











Natrona County, WY: TAR not performed TAR not performed 71*
Directly Funded Localities and Locality Scores 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Chicago (City of), IL: 94* 99* 99***
District of Columbia: 94* 95* 95*.**
Los Angeles County, CA: 81* 92* 92***
New York City, NY:
(includes Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond counties) 99* 100* 100***
Source: CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile; 2007-2008 data: 8/10/2007-8/9/2008 performance period; 2008-09 data: 
8/10/2008-8/9/2009performance period; 2009-10 data: 8/10/2009-2010 performance period
*  C D C  co n d u c te d  th e  TAR
* *  S c o re  re p re se n ts  TA R  re su lt fro m  2008-09 p e r fo rm a n c e  p eriod . D u e  to  d e m a n d s  o f  th e  H 1N 1  p a n d e m ic  respo nse ,
s ta te  and  local ju r isd ic tio n s  a ch ie v in g  a sco re  o f  90  o r  h ig h er w e re  e x e m p t from  p e rfo rm in g  T A R  in 2009-10.
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Endnotes
1 References to CDC also apply to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
2 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning; CDC, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response (2011). Available at http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/capabilities/index.htm
3 National Health Security Strategy; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2009). Available at 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Pages/default.aspx
4 The office was originally established in 2002 as the Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response and 
renamed the Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response in 2005 during a CDC 
reorganization. In 2009, the name of the office was changed to the Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response as 
part of CDC's organizational improvement.
5 The National Response Framework, which replaced the National Response Plan in 2008, establishes a comprehensive, 
national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response (http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf). This 
document and the National Preparedness Guidelines constitute the core of the nation's preparedness policies.
6 The three previous CDC preparedness reports are the following:
Public Health Preparedness: Strengthening the Nation's Emergency Response State by State; CDC, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response. Published in 2010, this report features national data as well as individual fact sheets for the 50 
states and 4 localities supported by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement. The report also 
highlights snapshots of state and local response activities occurring during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/pubs-links/2010/.
Public Health Preparedness: Strengthening CDC's Emergency Response; CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response. Published in 2009, this report explains CDC's role in preparing the public health infrastructure to respond 
effectively to all types of hazards. The report also describes the broad range of preparedness programs funded at CDC and 
at state and local health departments which are supported by the Congressional Preparedness and Emergency Response 
allocation. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/pubs-links/2009/.
Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State By State; CDC, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response. Published in 
2008, this report highlights preparedness progress and challenges at state and local public health departments and outlines 
CDC's efforts to address those challenges. The report presents national data as well as state-specific snapshots for the 50 
states and 4 localities supported by CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement. Available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/pubs-links/2008/.
7 From Hospitals to Healthcare Coalitions: Transforming Health Preparedness and Response in Our Communities. Report on the 
Hospital Preparedness Program; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (2011). Available at http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/Documents/hpp- 
healthcare-coalitions.pdf
8 The possession, use, and transfer of biological agents and toxins that could pose a severe threat to public health and safety 
are regulated by CDC's Select Agent Program. See http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/dsat.htm.
9 The total LRN number of laboratories fluctuates over time. LRN laboratories' assessment of the specific agents that they 
need to test for can change, and the resources available to maintain membership may change as well.
10 2008 data: Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) data from the 2008 All-Hazards Laboratory Preparedness
Survey, 8/31/2007-8/30/2008. 2010 data: APHL data from the 2010 All-Hazards Laboratory Preparedness Survey, 8/10/2009­
8/9/2010.
11 Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are composed of multiple counties and are defined by the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget. More information is available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/metroareas/metrodef.html.
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